Spanish Foreign Policy during the Second World War. A Historiographical Overview

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El artículo estudia los principales trabajos, líneas de investigación y escuelas de interpretación centrados en la política española durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, con dos objetivos principales: En primer lugar, analizar las perspectivas desde las que la cuestión ha sido abordada, prestando atención a los logros y deficiencias persistentes de la historiografía sobre el periodo, a la luz de las más recientes investigaciones y, en segundo lugar, ponderar cómo y en qué extensión contextos no europeos (principalmente Iberoamérica y Asia) han merecido la atención de los historiadores de la política exterior del primer franquismo.

Así, el artículo se divide en tres apartados principales. En el primero de ellos, Memorias y Primeros Análisis, se abordan las interpretaciones iniciales sobre la cuestión, en gran medida las más complacientes con el régimen franquista, surgidas desde la inmediata posguerra. Por otro lado, el apartado analiza las memorias escritas en estos años por muchos de los más importantes protagonistas de la peripecia política y diplomática de los años de la Guerra.

En el segundo apartado, Corrientes Historiográficas Actuales, la atención se centra en los análisis realizados desde la instauración de la democracia en España, en 1978, y la apertura de los principales archivos sobre el periodo, fundamentalmente el del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, hasta nuestros días. El artículo aborda la efervescencia historiográfica de las décadas de los ochenta y de los noventa, cerrándose con una reflexión sobre la relativa esterilidad que define el momento actual en lo referente a estudios o líneas de investigación novedosas sobre la cuestión analizada.

Finalmente, en el último apartado ¿Entornos Olvidados?. Iberoamérica y Asia, el artículo aborda las obras y los autores que se han centrado en el estudio de la importancia no sólo de Iberoamérica, cuyo peso específico en cualquier cuestión relativa a la política exterior española es insoslayable, sino también de Asia (principalmente de Japón y de las Filipinas), en el conjunto de la política exterior del régimen franquista durante la II Guerra Mundial. Por ejemplo, se presenta el debate sobre la naturaleza y alcance del concepto de Hispanidad (que se desarrolló, en este momento, con una clara voluntad expansiva) o el de la importancia real del Consejo de la Hispanidad o de la Falange Exterior como instrumentos de esa dialéctica beligerante, voluntariosa pero incapaz, cuyo planteamiento y posterior repliegue define la política sobre el periodo, en lo referido a estos ámbitos.
A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature is constituted to be that profound secret and mystery to every other. A solemn consideration, when I enter a great city by night, that every one of those darkly clustered houses encloses its own secret; that every room in every one of them encloses its own secret; that every beating heart in the hundreds of thousands of breasts there, is, in some of its imaginings, a secret to the heart nearest it.

Charles Dickens
*A Tale of Two Cities.*

**INTRODUCTION**

Few historiographical debates generate as much controversy, not only in academia, but in Spanish society as a whole, as the development of Spanish policy during World War II. Nonetheless, publications on Franco’s early regime that, to a greater or lesser extent, touch on the core question that this article approaches, are only relatively abundant, and have not developed into a general and regional body of studies¹. Thus, the image projected by the historiography on this topic is that of a framework lacking articulation, and burdened not only by dispersal, but by what appear to be a more-than-surprising inability of the research community to generate, from the more important foci of scientific production, authentic schools of interpretation and identifiable lines of investigation, which would allow the principal contributions to the topic to be systematized in a coherent way. Thus, it is still an uncompleted task to promote the formation of varied work groups, committed to specific lines of investigation; which, probably, would avoid the reiterative character of many publications – and probably their excessive indebtedness to their predecessors.

Spanish foreign policy between 1939 and 1945 was determined by a series of phases that, broadly, are defined as the stages of neutrality, non-belligerency, and neutrality through which the Spanish State passed during the War. Each of these phases, with their own characteristics and circumstances, were formed against the background of the development of long-term relationships not only with the principal belligerents, but also with other nations which, thanks to their political, religious or historical affinity, form a complex system that very much transcends the core European area. Be that as it may, it was the relations with the belligerents that determined the pace of Spanish policy and, in this respect, the War implies a process, with its singular effects on Spanish policy, which would enshrine the United States as the country with most influence on Spain.

**HISTORIOGRAPHY UNTIL 1975. MEMOIRS AND INITIAL ANALYSES**

It is almost unnecessary to indicate that it was not until the death of General Franco and the promulgation of the democratic Constitution of 1978 that, aside from it becoming possible to write with absolute freedom on history or any other topic, the opening of historical archives and the declassification of documents relating to the topic that we are analysing began. In the fundamental case of the archive of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, this was not to happen until 1984. Thus, the wealth of research carried out from that moment exceeded everything previously published, both in quality and quantity, although the dynamics of the first studies to which we refer in this section have marked, for varied reasons, the present-day historiographical debate beyond their concrete contribution.

We must emphasize that the question of Spanish policy during World War II generated an interest that led to the emergence of works on the subject not only after the War, but during it². Thus, in 1941 was published Reivindicaciones de España, by José María de Areilza and Fernando María Castiella³. The book, a great success in its time, is a decalogue of the imperial aspirations of the new regime. It is necessary to understand the political volatility of post-war Spain and it is surprising, knowing the radical ideological evolution of the authors after the World War, to observe how outré some of their claims were⁴. In another order of things, in 1943, Allan Chase, who clearly identified with those defeated in the Civil War, published Falange. The Axis Secret Army in the Americas⁵: a work in which, with first hand information and a perspective that was understandably completely alarmist, the author analysed the influence of the Foreign Falange in the American continent (including the USA) and the Philippines. Chase’s work, which is helpful in order to place oneself in the context of the moment, presented the Foreign Falange as a possible seed of a post-war fascism, a perception that was shared in the years after 1945 by the Allies when approaching the so-called ‘Spanish Question’. In the same deprecatory tone, with respect to the Spanish position, we find a key work for any research on the topic. Sir Samuel Hoare published, in 1946, Ambas- sador on Special Mission⁶, the memoirs of his embassy in Spain between 1940 and 1944, which, with a very valuable documentary contribution, carries out an eminently critical and even disdainful analysis of the digressive attitude of the Franco regime with regard to the conflict, with the fundamental exception of Francisco Gómez-Jordana’s work as minister of Foreign Affairs, from 1942⁷.

In this respect, it is paradoxical that it was from the transatlantic ally of the English that there came, since 1945, a new and, in a sense, surprising interpretation of Franco and his regime in the period we wish to analyse. In 1945, Carlton J.H. Hayes, US ambassador in Spain from spring of 1942 until 1945, published the memoirs of his Wartime Mission in Spain⁸. A work far more ingenuous than that of Hoare; it is sufficient in order to situate the reader with respect to the ambassador’s perspective – not of identification, but rather of complaisance with the Franco regime – to mention that one year after its publication in the United States a Spanish edition appeared, printed in Madrid. This approach, inaugurated by Hayes’s work, initiated, so to speak, a tradition and, in a sense, a fascination with the Franco regime, buoyed up by the trend in international political reality after the War. As we have indicated, this approach does not go to the length of fundamentally identifying with the Spanish dictatorial regime, but it does express praise, more or less veiled, for the small and defenceless country which was able to sail in turbulent waters without ever yielding to Hitler’s pressures. This perspective is clearly exposed by Hayes himself:

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While the victory of the Axis seemed to him inevitable, with nearly the whole of the European continent under the control of Germany, with the Teutonic armies massed close to the Pyrenees and the seas around Spain infested with German submarines, he made Hitler and the whole world believe that he leant towards the Axis. (...) The fact is that, at least since he removed Serrano-Suñer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of the Falange, general Franco directed or supported the members of his Government in the effort to bring the official position of Spain closer to the attitude of sympathy with the Allies of the great majority of the Spanish People.

In the same line, though from a less innocent position with regard to a reality that often imposes itself, and undoubtedly better depicted as a whole by Hoare, we may situate other works such as those of H. Feis, *The Spanish History, Franco and the Nations War* or the memoirs of the counsellor of the American embassy in Madrid, Willard L. Beaulac, with the revealing title of *Franco, Secret Ally in the Second World War*. From the Spanish perspective, it is possible that this unexpectedly favourable context was the fuse for the works of justification for Spanish actions published during the same period. Fundamentally these are the memoirs of Serrano-Suñer, principally *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar*, which, in the context of the remarkable ideological development of the former minister in the post-war period, presents the non-entry of Spain in the War as the direct result of his policy and that of his brother-in-law, Franco. Finally, another work eminently devoted to justification Spanish policy is *España Tenía Razón*, by Jose Maria Doussinague, General Director of Foreign Policy (equivalent to being second-in-command in the Palace of Santa Cruz), during the ministry of Gómez-Jordana.

The first scientific and academic work on the topic was a doctoral thesis written in 1956, *The Relations of General Franco and the Spanish Nationalists with the Axis Powers*, by Elizabeth Parr. The author does not work with unpublished materials, but with the existing bibliography and with the then insufficient published sources. These first studies, coming, for obvious reasons, from beyond Spanish borders, continue, already in the full flush of the Cold War, and to a great extent influenced by it, to present a more-or-less benign image of Franco’s regime during the War years. Such is the case of the first scientific study on the Blue Division, Raymond Proctor’s *Agony of a Neutral: Spanish-German Wartime Relations and the “Blue Division”*. For Proctor, as late as 1974, the most notable facts of foreign Spanish policy during the War could be codified in the fact that, “Spain emerged from the Second World War with her government and her territorial integrity intact (...).” For this author, the presence of a voluntary Division fighting on the German side on the Eastern front does not change the nature of this balance. In the same line as Proctor’s are the works of Halstead, Cortada or Detwiler.

Within Spanish historiography itself, because of the aforementioned imponderables, this thesis, necessarily with the title of an essay, sweetened and laudatory, with regard to the Spanish attitude and the role of Franco himself, was also presented. Ricardo de la Cierva’s works correspond paradigmatically to this tendency; probably the most brilliant of historians connected to the regime, he has, until the present day, maintained the thesis of a Franco fundamentally resistant to the pressures of the Axis. If in the case of
de la Cierva his political commitment to the Franco regime is clear, it is also necessary to indicate that, with nuances, this thesis has also been maintained by the majority of conservative Spanish historians, not only before, but also after 1978.

**Current Historiographical Trends**

We must repeat that current historiography on the Spanish attitude during World War II is inevitably burdened by a necessarily limited temporal context and that, as we have indicated, although it begins, *strictu sensu*, in 1978, with the restoration of the democratic regime, it could not reach its complete potential until the opening of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1984. On the other hand, logically, the primary interest of the investigators at this time was in the thorny question of the Civil War, which, as one of the most dramatic episodes in Spanish history, leading to the genesis of the Franco regime itself and as unavoidable reference point for any interpretation of the subsequent period, necessarily represented a land of promise for a whole generation of young researchers. Be that as it may, the question of the first years after the Civil War and the initial stages of Franco’s diplomacy also quickly became objects of study. Nonetheless the balance that can be made of the state of the question is, in general lines, the same that professor Francisco Quintana outlined, considering the progress of the history of international relations in Spain, as late as 1996. For Quintana the situation could only be defined as a *chiaroscuro* determined by evident progress and persistent backwardness with regard to the wealth of approaches and methods utilised in other European contexts.

In this respect, the first catalyst for research activity in the Spanish environment was Klaus-Jörg Ruhl’s work, *Franco Falange and Third Reich*, published in Germany in 1975, but not translated into Spanish until 1986. This study implied the first exhaustive investigation of the resources relating to Spain in German and English archives which, for its methodological value, continues today to be an essential reference point, acknowledged or not, for many of the investigations undertaken on the period undertaken. When analysing the rhythms of Spanish policy, Ruhl, fleeing from simplistic or propaganda-based explanations, analyses the development of the relations between the two countries, studying the policy of the different German ambassadors in Spain. On the other hand, the author also pays attention to the role that, for Hitler, Spain played in his European system; he considers for the first time General Muñoz Grandes’ temptation to carry out a coup d’état, and approaches the tensions in the bosom of the different groups supporting the Franco regime, as well as the importance to Germany of Spanish exports of tungsten and the Allied pressures to halt this traffic. For Ruhl:

> During World War II, the question of the entry of Spain into the war on the Axis side, constituted the greatest test for Franco’s regime. This question was closely linked to that of the reconstruction and organization of the Franco system and of its foreign policy orientation, such that during the years 1941-1942 and ‘43 Spain was on the verge of political destruction. Defenders and detractors recruited their followers from all the social estates (...)”

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Returning to the Spanish context, we must emphasize that, although, as Quintana affirms, the development and modernization of the history of the international relations in the country took place in the university centres of the Spanish capital (Alcalá de Henares, the Autonomous University of Madrid, the CSIC [Higher Council of Scientific Research] and UNED [the National University of Distance Learning]), it was in the research environment of UNED that, from the start, the greatest impulse was given to tackling a necessary review of the approaches to Spanish foreign policy during World War II. Javier Tusell, who died in 2005, is enshrined as an indisputable historiographical referent in Spanish historiography on the topic, not only as the author of key works from a certain perspective, which from the 1980s and 1990s was predominant, but also for his work as the director of many Doctoral Theses of the second generation of experts on the period. What we might call the historiographical school of the UNED, despite its character now being slightly clouded, is really the only definite referent for studies on the period.

The process of revision, almost the start of the archival investigation in the Spanish environment, led largely by the UNED school, was inaugurated by Víctor Morales-Lezcano in his work *Historia de la No-beligerancia Española Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial (VI, 1940-X, 1943)*. Morales-Lezcano’s work meant the first approach of post-Franco Spanish historiography to the question of Spanish foreign policy during World War II, with new perspectives for a more correct understanding of the question, such as a new definition of the scope and intentions of the declaration of non-neutrality of 1940, defined as a “(…) ‘gradual step of the new State towards belligerency’”.

Regarding the debate on Spanish neutrality and its non-belligerent nuances, Morales-Lezcano gives a very critical interpretation of the Spanish attitude, which would later be taken up by Javier Tusell, fundamentally from 1995. In this respect, Morales-Lezcano affirms that:

> The whole polemic inspired by the Spanish “vigilant neutrality” is, to a great extent, the result of a few unilateral approaches, influenced by a historiography that should no longer have needed to be limited by the proximity of the event, and therefore for the passionate conditioning that – to a greater or lesser degree – we imagine would perturb the spirit of the historian of contemporary times.

In 1985, Javier Tusell, together with Genoveva García Queipo de Llano, published *Franco y Mussolini: la Política Española Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial*. In the context of the disproportionate exaltation of the Caudillo and his regime, for his skill in keeping Spain out of the war, without yielding to the pressures and excesses of either side, which had impregnated most of the previous historiographical trends, and in view of the documentary evidence, a review of concepts and periodisation was more than necessary. The work, fundamentally based on consultation of Italian, but also Spanish, archives, was much more balanced in its results, as we will see, than later studies on the topic by Tusell. The conclusions are necessarily placed at a middle point between opposing trends, later abandoned by the author who, in the next ten years, would experience a marked ideological drift from the political centre to more extreme positions. For Tusell:
There were certain constants in the Spanish position: undoubted sympathy for the Axis, caution and nationalism. This sympathy explains the misdiagnosis of the result of the conflict, very common in all the sectors of the Franco regime. On many occasions, during the conflict, Franco was neither skilful nor prudent. Nevertheless, he was cautious and that means, especially, that he wanted to see clearly exposed the advantages that he would obtain from participating in the conflict. While this was unclear, he was not going to take the risk.

On the lines opened by Tusell and García Queipo de Llano, in 1993 the UNED organized an *International Congress on Franco’s Regime*, in which, almost for the first time, a scientific and, especially, global effort was made to approach the Franco political system from new perspectives. An important number of the communications to the congress centred on the regime’s foreign policy and among them we find contributions of interest. Jean François Berdah analysed British cultural propaganda in Spain during the first years of the regime; Rafael García Perez, the imperialistic ambitions of Franco’s early regime, Susana Sueiro centred on the territorial pretensions of Spain in Morocco, through the perspective of British diplomacy; Francisco Torres García analysed the process of return to neutrality, via the negotiations for the retreat of the Blue Division. Though here we do not consider some communications that, due to their specific nature, will be covered in the following section, the general balance of the conference, as regards our topic of study, was not entirely satisfactory. Franco’s early regime had not yet been outlined and characterised methodologically as a definite period and the contributions on a question as relevant as that of foreign policy during World War II, were not sufficiently strong in relation to other topics, probably less important, in the whole context of the foreign action of the regime until 1975; even more so when the latter, after the War, was defined by its low profile and will to survival.

The historiographical thrust in the question, shown by the UNED, also materialized in the journal *Espacio Tiempo y Forma* (Contemporary History series) that acted, especially in the 1990s, as the principal collector of research on the period. Most of the 1994 issue was dedicated to analysing monographically the question of Spain and the Second World War. Besides the perspectives presented at the Congress of the previous year, which are repeated in the approach to the topic of the journal (articles by Susana Sueiro and Rafael García Perez) the issue meant the first contact with relevant topics such as that of German propaganda in Spain during the War, approached by Carlos Velasco and Ingrid Schulze; combined Anglo-American diplomacy between 1942 and 1945, analysed by Carlos Collado; or Spanish relations with France or Portugal in the War years, a question approached by Maria Soledad Gómez de las Heras. Other new and suggestive perspectives relating to Spanish policy with other more distant horizons, will be commented on in the following section.

The same year, 1994, Rafael García Pérez, trained in the University of Alcalá de Henares (Madrid), published *Franquismo y III Reich*: a work centred on the analysis of economic relations between Spain and Nazi Germany after the conclusion of the Civil War. Comparable to Ruhl’s work for the extent of the German documentation covered...
and for its perspective, the work was a milestone that wove the economic factor together with the analysis of the political and diplomatic dynamics. For García Perez:

(...) The Spanish attitude to the German Reich and implicitly, the position of Franco’s regime in the Second World War, was determined by the heterogeneity of political forces supporting the Regime and by the lack of consensus to construct a State model. The period of greatest involvement of the Franco regime with Hitler’s New Order, which chronologically corresponds with the ministry of Ramon Serrano-Suñer, became a chronicle of misunderstandings marked by mutual frustration (...).

In 1995, Javier Tusell published *Franco, España y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, entre el Eje y la Neutralidad*. The work is still considered today as the principal monographic study on Spanish foreign policy of the period and implies the consecration of the author’s drift towards more extreme political positions, from his collaboration with the centrist governments of the UCD during the first years of the democracy. Tusell’s central thesis, canonical for the majority of specialists until today – more in line with Morales-Lezcano than with his previous work on the topic, which we have analysed – now presents Franco as anxious, until 1941, to enter the War on Germany’s side, as the inventor of Serrano-Suñer’s vast pro-Axis policy, and convinced of the Reich’s inevitable victory up to a very late date. If Spain did not take part in the war it was, in the words of the author, “(...) a pure miracle (...)”, always derived from the actions of third countries or of politicians who were in no case Spanish. For Tusell, Spain only deserved the epithet of neutral at the beginning and end of the War, “(...) but only joined with another epithet, benevolent, and taking into account that in 1939 it was towards Germany and in 1945, towards the United States”. The periodization presented by Tusell supports the rhythms he proposed in 1985, and can be discussed in the light of the analysis of the documentation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He highlights a tendency, which has continued up to the present, which defines the critical moment for the entry of Spain in the conflict as the period framing the Hendaye meeting of 1940, giving less importance to the initial months of 1943, when Germany, in the face of a Spain that was beginning to distance itself from the Axis, intensely pressed Franco’s regime to join the conflict. Drawing his conclusions, Tusell, at times, forces his sources too much in order to propose, from the first moment, his principal thesis, which he has defended, on occasions, in an excessively dogmatic way, in clear contrast with his previous monograph on the topic. Be that as it may, the importance of the study, which was born in a fertile area for aggressive approaches, means that the work continues to be the principal referent of Spanish historiography on the period.

It is natural that Tusell’s work, which marked an increasing belligerent drift in the historiography on the period, did not please the academic community with links, to a greater or lesser extent, with Franco’s regime. It was a modernist of the old school, Luis Suárez, who articulated, through the study of documentation, then unpublished, of the Francisco Franco Foundation, the conservative response to Tusell’s work. The reindicative value of the work is clear when we consider that, as part of a series of volumes on the history of Franco’s regime, then being prepared by Suárez (*Franco, Crónica de un*)...
The state of the question, based on the references described above, has not suffered substantial modifications up to the present moment. The certain impulse shown by Spanish historiography up the mid-1990s has not had, probably, all the necessary development in later years, until 2002. In this year, besides the re-edition of Paul Preston’s biography of Franco, published in 1993, appeared La Guerra Secreta de Franco, by Manuel Ros Agudo; a work that, due to its approach, documentary contribution and perspective, is the most relevant contribution to the question since 1995. The book makes clear, in the historiographical line defined by Tusell, the Spanish military pacification to join the Axis until 1941, the German activities of espionage and sabotage carried out with the knowledge of the Spanish government until 1944, as well as the Spanish collaboration with the Gestapo. For Ros Agudo, who emphasizes the importance of the (fantasy-prone) Spanish military planning – with a view to taking part in the conflict looming over Europe – prior even to the conclusion of the Civil War (which contradicts the supposed opportunist or transitory nature of Franco’s policy), the field in which the Germans gained most benefit was that of information, an aspect that he analyzes thoroughly.

In the same line, though probably less novel for the documentary evidence produced, the year 2005 saw the publication of two works similar in their aims and titles, though not in their results. These are Enrique Moradiellos’s study, Franco frente a Churchill, and Churchill and Franco by Richard Wigg. This second work, due to the limitation of the archives consulted, is merely an approach, journalistic in tone, to Anglo-Spanish relations during the conflict. Moradiellos’s work, though not novel as regards its approach or methodology, brings, thanks to the range of archives consulted, a significant documentary contribution.

Though at the end of this chapter we will dedicate a few lines to gathering some main conclusions, we may say, as a provisional evaluation, that beyond the publication of monographs and articles in the 1980s and 1990s, and the concern for research of which they are evidence, the recent past, aside from some exceptions, has been characterized as a tunnel of a certain sterility. Beside a lack of novel methodological approaches, per-
spectives or periodizations that would allow us to go forward in the historiographical debate on the question considered, we glimpse a new period in which, buoyed up by a brand new conservative historiography, challenging and probably less subtle than those preceding it (that of Suárez or de la Cierva as outstanding examples), we see not a new historiographical advance, but rather unbearable concentration on a sterile and repetitive contest between left- and right-wing tendencies, increasingly radicalized and, therefore, less scientific.

Forgotten Environments? Latin America and Asia

As has become clear in the above pages, the bibliographical corpus on Spanish foreign policy during World War II centres fundamentally on the analysis of Spanish relations with other countries in the European environment. Beyond the logical explanation that, with the exception of the United States and Japan, the core combatants were nations from this context, we have to consider, in order to evaluate correctly this eurocentrism, the logistic difficulties inherent in accomplishing a documentary search in more distant areas, such as the American continent or the region of the Pacific. Since the CLIOHRES work group, for which this study has been made, deals with Europe’s relations with the world, we have left for this last section a very interesting group of works and authors, pioneers in a series of lines of research that have centred first and foremost on the role of relations with Spanish America, but also on more distant environments such as the Japanese empire, China, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Thailand (in these cases we can almost speak of a single individual). As these researchers belong to the second generation of historians of the democracy, who defended their theses during the 1980s and 1990s, we must emphasize that, very possibly due to the circumstances described at the close of the previous section, their works have not yet benefited by being continued by new generations of young researchers.

In 1988, Lorenzo Delgado, a CSIC researcher, published Diplomacia Franquista y Política Cultural Hacia Iberoamérica, 1939-1953. The work meant a great advance in knowledge of the political articulation of the cultural diplomacy of Franco’s regime with regard to an environment that is considered a canonical promised land for Spanish foreign policy. For the author, the policy of Hispanidad [Spanishness] materialized in the creation of the Consejo de la Hispanidad (2 November, 1940), under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then occupied by Ramon Serrano-Suñer, and implied an attempt to exploit the American heritage as a way to gain ground in the international theatre, with respect to the real relevance prefigured by the general characteristics of the Franco regime. It was a question, in the end, of boosting Spain’s stock, first with Germany and later on, from a lower dialectical profile, with the victors of the War. For Delgado:

Serrano-Suñer aspired to exploit the secular links with Latin America to allow a lasting close-ness between the countries of that continent and Franco’s Spain; in such a process the desire was perceptible –sometimes barely concealed– to practice a sort of patronage over the region. This tendency received the not-so-discreet support of the Nazi leaders, who saw in it a means of clandestinely meddling in American affairs...
Though the aims of this over-ambitious policy meant concentrating on very specific measures, the reality is that: "...The Spanish regime did not have the mobilizing capacity nor sufficient resources to carry out plans that were as ambitious as they were Utopian at that historical moment..."55. Thus, for Delgado, this was a policy frustrated from the beginning. From the end of 1941, several Latin-American governments prohibited subsidiaries of the Nazi Party and of the Falange in their countries, so that the work of the Consejo de la Hispanidad soon became limited to the cultural sphere. In any case, Delgado emphasizes that the American link was an essential axis of Spanish policy – one of few that they were able to put into action – up to the end of international isolation, in 1953.

In the aforementioned work, Delgado affirmed that his conclusions were at the level of hypotheses; the CSIC researcher would present his thesis in a more complete form in 1992. The work takes as its graphic title Imperio de papel. Acción Cultural y Política Exterior Durante el Primer Franquismo56. In the study, Delgado refines his references to the reorientation in diplomatic relations with Latin America, and in the strategic conception of this, after the arrival of Gómez Jordana at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, carrying out, likewise, a study of the positions of several intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic on the question, such as Ortega or Salvador de Madariaga. To define this process of mutation in Spanish foreign policy, Delgado coins the term “chamaeleonic coupling”57, that well serves to define the spirit of Spanish foreign relations during much of Franco’s regime58.

Two years later, in 1994, Rosa Pardo Sanz, linked with the UNED, published Con Franco hacia el Imperio! La política Exterior Española en América Latina 1939-194559. In a line that, inevitably, assumes Lorenzo Delgado’s principal conclusions and perspectives and is indebted to Tusell’s approaches, the work seeks to develop the analysis, not merely of cultural policy, but also of Spanish policy as a whole towards Latin America, in the period that we are analysing. The author presents as a great mistake of interpretation by Franco’s diplomats and the Falange the belief that South America was fertile ground for a policy that was, even dialectically, expansionist and over-ambitious. Thus they perceived as encouraging signs the friendly attitude of Catholic and conservative groups towards the regime, as well as the conciliatory mien of the authorities of different countries towards Franco’s Spain after the Civil War. For the author, the dictatorship underestimated the depth of antipathy towards the new regime generated during the Civil War, as well as the permanent reminder that Republican exiles constituted (in the case of Mexico especially), and the overwhelming influence of the United States, with which it was futile to compete. On the other hand, for Pardo: "(...) The attempt to bring the Spanish colonies under the Falangist yoke caused more problems than it resolved, provoking clashes and creating a power structure parallel to diplomacy with a program of action that was as radical as it was unviable (...)"60. Thus, for Pardo, the Foreign Falange in America entered a crisis from the beginning of the World War.

In the political failure described, from the grand plans of 1939 up to the defensive strategy of Spring 1945, the factor that stands out is the blindness of the Spanish leaders to judge with equa-
nimity the reality of the Latin American situation and their inability to internalise the fact that the American response had been clear since 1936. The paternalism and, at times, disdain that appear in the judgments of the diplomats conceal their resistance to recognizing the adulthood of the Latin American states and, therefore, the independence of their actions. (...) The naming of the section in charge of American affairs as “Utramar” (“Overseas [Dependencies]”) until 1944 can not be considered as happenstance. Such a word had certain imperialistic connotations that spoke much of the more or less unconscious aspirations which they had never renounced (...)61.

Besides these monographic references, there are some articles centred on the relations between Franco’s regime and certain Latin American countries. Thus, Encarnación Ortega has analysed the Chilean case, which is located in the interpretative line previously exposed62. On the other hand, Mónica Quijada’s article about the relations between Spain and Argentina during the War is of great interest. Quijada affirms the existence of a Madrid-Buenos Aires Axis, which appears as an exception to the trends pointed to by Delgado and Pardo. For the author it is conceivable that the favoured relationship between the two countries offered the German secret services a ‘triangular field of action’63 that could be used for such ends as propaganda and espionage. In any case, the author minimizes, in contrast with the exaggeration of these realities after the War, any real damage towards the Allies, finding negative effects rather for the axis countries. Finally, we must return to Rosa Pardo who has analysed the relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the colonies of pro-Republican exiles in America64. Pardo emphasizes the absence of a conciliatory policy (unsurprisingly) on the part of the Franco administration, once the Civil War was over, and which continued, in a more radical way, until 1945. The article brings us close to the rise and fall of the Foreign Falange as the agency responsible for the organization and vigilance of Spanish communities in Latin America, giving special attention to the case of Mexico and analysing the repressive measures that were proposed for the Republicans in America65.

While, as we have seen, the American environment has deserved (marginally) the attention of the investigators in the context that we are analysing, we cannot say the same of Pacific region, that is, fundamentally, Japan, China, Thailand and the Philippines. Practically only a single researcher, Florentino Rodao, has recently given attention to an area that, in the light of the documentation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the fundamental importance of the country in question in the War, is far from secondary. In Franco y el Imperio Japonés66, a work supported with an astounding wealth of documentary evidence, not only of Spanish and Japanese but also Italian, American, English and even Canadian fi les, Rodao exposes the perceptions that the two countries had of one another in 1939 and their evolution, emphasizing the superiority of Japan, where a definite academic concern developed for knowledge with regard to Spain67. Rodao analyses how Japan’s membership in a common alliance with Spain (the Antikomintern agreement) allowed an image of the former country in the Franco regime to be created that was quite distinct from the general perception of the Asian world as a threat68. “This ideal image of Japan was brief. It had grown from 1937 and was intensified with the fall of France in the summer of 1940, but began to decline in the middle of 1941, with Japan’s refusal to support the German attack on the Soviet Union (...) This
idealization was comparable to that of the Soviet Union by the Spanish left wing (…)". On the other hand, Rodao studies the Spanish carrying out of Japanese interests in the United States after the assault on Pearl Harbour, the moment at which the increasing Japanese presence in the Pacific Ocean began to cause division and alarm among the Spanish leaders, which would materialize in the claim of independence (based on Christianity) for the Philippines by Spain. Be that as it may, for Rodao, Spain had a key role in establishing the Japanese secret service, the To network, in the United States, at that moment, thanks to Serrano-Suñer: “The Falange and the Spanish Embassy in Washington were among the initial supports to put the network in action, the first for ideological reasons and the second for infrastructure reasons (…)”. The arrival at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Gómez-Jordana meant the materialization of the slow cooling off of relations between the two countries, which he framed in the theory of Franco’s three wars. This was a cynical diplomatic formulation used by Franco and his minister from 1943 which differentiated between the war of the Allies with Germany, of the latter with the Soviet Union and of the Pacific region with Japan. With this division Franco and the regime affirmed their increasing antipathy towards the Japanese cause.

(...) Franco’s critique of the Japanese as imperialists (this in 1943) showed his envy for their having obtained what his Spain so desired. His affirmation of the superficiality of the Japanese occidentalisation was a reflection of the mistrust that Japan was stimulating in very disparate political areas in the West and can be found both in British propaganda and in Hitler’s Mein Kampf (…). In this change of attitude of the Spanish policy towards Japan, Franco’s regime even considered the possibility of declaring war on the Japanese Empire in 1945. Rodao tells how the really astonishing idea of sending a new version of the Blue Division to fight alongside General MacArthur arose among the Falangist ranks.

Rodao’s reflections also include the relations of Franco’s regime with the turbulent China of the 1940s. First, the author analyses the relations of Spain with the puppet state of Machukuo, which demonstrate the limitations of Spanish foreign action, inherent in the diplomatic and economic weakness generated by the Civil War. Thus, though these relations were established in 1939, with Machukuo opening a delegation in Madrid, it would not be until 1942 that Spain designated an ambassador in return, having to resort to an uncontrollable diplomat located in Peking. Be that as it may, once the ambassador was named, he never remained in a permanent way in the precarious legation, a building whose temperature ranged between 7 and 10 degrees. The absence of a Spanish colony or of missions with Spanish priests in the area created the perception that, with grave limitations, the representation in Machukuo was merely trying to present a good image to the Axis.

More interesting, in this respect, are the manoeuvres of Franco’s regime to chisel out a niche in the diplomatic sphere of convulsed central China. Rodao revisits the origins of the Chinese crisis and its derivation in the clash between the communists and the nationalists of the Guomindang, complicated by the war with Japan (from 1937). In this
respect, he analyzes how the Japanese prevalence, from 1939, tended to favour, more than the political fragmentation of the country, the implantation of a central government, coinciding with the moment when Franco’s Spain turned its eyes towards Asia, after the Civil War. The effort to re-establish relations with China, on this convulsed stage, was led by the diplomat Pedro de Igual, but Spain did not start out from a position of even vaguely accurate knowledge of the general situation of the country, which would have allowed it to act appropriately. This situation was aggravated by the absence of the right of extraterritoriality (the legal authority to exercise consular jurisdiction over citizens). This last factor made senseless any desire to design an independent diplomatic or consular work that, on the other hand, proved to be doubtful when recognizing either Wang’s pro-Japanese or Jiang’s nationalist government. The fortune of both sides in their struggle, together with the compulsory Spanish commitment to the diplomatic action of the countries of the Axis, especially Italy (that pressed Spain to return to the line favourable to Wang, facing with any lukewarm Spanish attempt to develop its own policy), led to the formal recognition of the latter by Spain in July 1941. In any case, this does not imply a significant advance in the solution of the principal concerns of Spain in China, principally extraterritoriality. For Rodao: “The relationship with China had a single path, passing through Tokyo, Rome and Berlin.”

Relations with pro-Japanese Thailand are also touched on in Rodao’s work. Spain had not renounced the unequal agreements of the western powers with the Asian country, since this renunciation took place in 1937, in the midst of the Civil War. The regime showed an interest in the Thai case after a letter from the Gabrielist Brothers addressed personally to General Franco invited him, based on Thai-Japanese friendship, to designate the Spanish minister in Tokyo as permanent representative in Bangkok. Optimism about the perspectives of the diplomatic relations with Thailand in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ended when Bangkok requested prior renunciation of the unequal agreements. From 1943, the march of the War definitively paralysed the Thai project. Finally, we must emphasize that, beyond the time-frame we are analyzing, the Korean War gave Spain a chance to boost its stock with the United States. Then, Spain signed, in haste, a treaty, opening an embassy in 1953, with the mission to promote friendship with the American ally. After the war and the removal of North American interests from the region, Thailand returned, for Franco’s regime, to where it had always been: the souvenir chest.

Finally, the Philippine question. This case took on a special relevance, since even at the time of the Second World War, the memory of the loss of the archipelago, together with that of Cuba in 1898, was still very present in Spain. Rodao analyses, with the same methodology used in the Japanese case, the evolution of the mentalities of the Spanish community in the Philippines and in the former colonizing power, and the desire to strengthen the bonds of union between the two, after the Civil War tinged this with an inevitable and increasing anti-Americanism, that grew with the march of the German victories. In this context, though soon this perception changed from seeing Japan as the liberating power from the Chinese threat to seeing it, as we have men-
tioned, with increasing distrust, its role was accepted as a lever to provoke the exit of the United States from the islands. The Falange, from this perspective, was an instrument in the service of the interests of the Axis and of the future role of imperial Spain, still vague, in what came to be considered the possibility of a new wave of Hispanicization of the region, thanks to the Japanese advance. This positive perception ended, as we have seen, around 1941, the change being sharpened following the acceleration of the Japanese advance through the Pacific. In this context, Rodao’s analysis of the Laurel incident is prominent. This was the letter of congratulation for the ‘independence’ of the Philippines – celebrated by the Axis – sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Philippine puppet president, José Laurel, on 18 October, 1943. The letter generated great tension in the relations between Spain and the United States, which instrumentalized the crisis to increase pressure on Spain, demanding the cessation of German activities in Tangier and the suspension of tungsten shipments to the Reich, just after the Spanish return to neutrality. Only the firm attitude of Jordana (who threatened the allied ambassadors with his resignation) managed to smooth over the initial grave moments of tension.

(...) Washington wheeled out this incident to use as a springboard. The scorn of Franco and other Spaniards towards Japan was no secret, as we have already seen, but Washington was not benefiting especially from it (...). Therefore it was normal that Washington should seek to shift this distaste of Madrid for Tokyo to a matter of much greater magnitude, relations with Berlin. (...) The collaboration with Germany was most affected by it, while that already existing with Japan suffered very little because it was already at a very low point. (...) The attitude of Washington had been the correct one, though it would then be delayed by the brave attitude of Jordana. (...)

On October 23rd, the chief of intelligence of Foreign Affairs, the Marquess of Rialp, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador, Suma, admitted that the exchange of telegrams implied formal recognition of Laurel, though he requested prudence by the Japanese in dealing with the matter, implicitly recognizing the fragile position of the Spanish government. The communication of this information by Suma to his government was intercepted by the United States who thus obtained, according to Rodao, benefit from its increasing technological superiority, by being able to judge accurately the effect of its pressure on Spain. From this moment, as we have seen, Spain’s Japanese policy would be an element designed to earn credibility with the Allies, whereas the United States enjoyed new sources of information to modulate its Spain policy.

Conclusions
Returning to Francisco Quintana’s article, to which we referred in the second paragraph, it reviewed some of the principal weaknesses of the history of international relations in Spain ten years ago, such as the absence of a deep interdisciplinary debate, the survival of a descriptive historical discourse and a clear imbalance in the perspectives adopted and the approaches on which these were based. Many of these critical points still constitute today the elements on which, in the future, it will be necessary to act in order to advance knowledge of the period on which this chapter is focussed. Though we cannot
ignore the important historiographical advances that have taken place concerning the question of Spanish foreign policy during the Second World War, which have permitted, in conditions that are not always suitable, an acceptable body of publications to be constructed practically from the foundations, nonetheless it is true that there are many points on which it is imperative to redouble the investigative work. The circumstances with whose description we closed the second section of this analysis mean that we are now at a crossroads for the historiography on the period. The great mass of documentation, some unpublished, preserved in the Spanish archives; the methodological innovations that new generations must define; the possibilities generated by interdisciplinary contact; as well as the perception that the increasing perspective with regard to the subject considered must encourage a diversification of approaches beyond a completely sterilizing over-simplification, and must urge the investigators to advance in the resolution of remaining uncertainties on the period, paying attention to the multitude of new perspectives and regional studies from whose results we can and should expect a great deal⁸⁴. I hope that this chapter helps, at least, to identify some of them.

NOTES

1 That is, focused on a specific area of foreign policy.

2 For more information about Spanish literature during the War and on the War, see J.C. Mainer, La Segunda Guerra Mundial y la Literatura Española. Algunos Libros de 1940-1955, in J.L. Garcia Delgado (ed.), El Primer Franquismo, España Durante la II Guerra Mundial, V Coloquio de Historia Contemporánea de España, Madrid 1989, pp. 245-268.

3 J.M. de Areilza - F.M. Castiella, Reivindicaciones de España, Madrid 1941.

4 Large areas of north Africa, equatorial Africa, parts of Vietnam, ports in the entrance of the Red Sea and, evidently, Gibraltar.


7 Jordana replaced Ramon Serrano-Suñer, of whom Hoare affirms that: "(...) for two years the Minister and I had been at almost open war with each other". Hoare, Ambassador cit., p. 166.


9 Hayes, Mission of War cit., p. 378.

10 H. Feis, The Spanish History, Franco and The Nation’s War, New York 1948. Feis was Adviser of International Affairs of the U.S. State Department (1931-1944), First Chairman of The Iberian Peninsula Operating Committee, Special Adviser to the Secretary of The Army and Head of the Interdepartmental Committee of Strategic and Critical Raw Materials.


12 R. Serrano-Suñer, Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar, Madrid 1947. Also of the same author, Memorias: Entre el Silencio y la Propaganda, la Historia como Fue, Barcelona 1978.
18 R. de la Cierva, *Francisco Franco, Un Siglo de España*, Madrid 1973 (2 vols); Id., *Historia del Franquismo I, Orígenes y Configuración*, Barcelona 1975. It is understandable that the renovation of the practice of history in Spain, in the second half of the century, fundamentally by the School of the Annales, did not affect the period that we are analyzing.
21 The first Commander in Chief of the Blue Division. He was sounded out by Hitler in 1942, presenting the idea of his substituting the Caudillo, or becoming president of a new Government in which Franco would be a figurehead, as step towards the participation of Spain in the War.
22 Ruhl, *Franco, Falange* cit., p. 257.
23 In this respect, it is necessary to mention a whole generation of historians who, in parallel to the efforts of the UNED, have led advances in the knowledge of our topic since the 1980s. In this respect we must mention Ángel Viñas, Manuel Espadas Burgos and Antonio Maquina. If this is the dominant trend it is necessary to state that, as an outstanding example, in 1984 María Jesús Cava published a biographical study on José Félix de Lequerica, ambassador in Vichy during the War, later minister of Foreign Affairs and ambassador to the United States. M.J. Cava, *Los Diplomáticos de Franco, José Félix de Lequerica, Temple y Tenacidad*, Bilbao 1984. The study was pioneering in a line of investigation, that of the labor – at times essential – of Franco’s ambassadors during the war. We must emphasize that surely the methodological complexity of this type of investigations has left until now the work of diplomats such as Gines Vidal in Berlin, Juan Francisco de Cádenas in the United States or the Duke of Alba in London, without a monographic study.
26 Ibid., p. 103.
28 Ibid., p. 283.
29 In 1992 the First Meeting of Historians on Franco’s Regime took place.


40 On the other hand we must note that the journal of the Association of Contemporary History, “Ayer”, dedicated an issue in 1998 to the perception of Spain abroad, entitled España, la Mirada del Otro, with contributions of interest on Franco’s regime, through the prism of the different European historiographies. Thus, Alfonso Botti and Ismael Saíz Campos analyzed the Italian perspective, A. Botti, El Franquismo en la Historiografía Italiana y la Mirada del Otro Sobre los Relatos de Otras Miradas, "Ayer", 31, 1998, pp. 127-148; I. Saz, El Objeto Cercano: La Dictadura Franquista en la Historiografía Italiana, pp. 149-162; Patricia Digón and Enrique Moradiellos studied British Hispanicist approach, P. Digón, El Hispanismo Británico y la Historiografía Contemporánea en España, pp. 163-182; E. Moradiellos, Más allá de la Leyenda Negra y del Mito Romántico: el concepto de España en el hispanismo británico contemporaneísta, pp. 183-200; W.L. Bernecker and J.J. Carreras focussed on the German perspective, W.L. Bernecker, La Historiografía Alemana sobre la Guerra Civil y el Franquismo, pp. 237-266; J.J. Carreras, Distante e Intermitente: España en la Historiografía Alemana, pp. 267-278.


42 García Pérez, Franquismo y Tercer Reich cit., p. 576. The work is opposed in some of its conclusions to the summary of Ángel Viñas’s articles on the topic, written 10 years before. A. Viñas, Guerra Dinero y Dictadura, Ayuda Fascista y Autarquía en la España de Franco, Barcelona 1984. In the same line of interpretation as García Pérez, see S. Payne, La Política, in J.L. García Delgado (ed.), El Franquismo, el juicio de la Historia, Madrid 2000. For an analysis of the families that supported the Franco regime, see A. de Miguel, Sociología del Franquismo, Barcelona 1978.

43 Tusell, Franco, España cit., p. 646.

44 Ibid.

45 Coinciding with the publication of Tusell’s work, in May and June, 1995, the Spanish Commission for the History of International Relations, in collaboration with UNED, organized a cycle of conferences with the title of España y la II Guerra Mundial, 50 años Después. The proceedings of the conferences were published in the Bulletin d’Histoire Contemporaine de l’Espagne, University of Bordeaux, no. 22 (December, 1995) and no. 23 (March, 1996).
This sector, during the 1990s, was already frankly in a minority in the field of contemporary history.


M. Ros Agudo, *La Guerra Secreta de Franco*, Barcelona 2002. From this perspective, it shows the sometimes excessively tremulous prudence of Spanish historiography that the reissue of a work more than ten years old (P. Preston, *Franco, Gautillio de España*, Barcelona 2002.) had a greater impact that the publication of the brand new and top-quality work by Ros Agudo. Unfortunately it seems that for studies on Franco’s regime, the foreign, fundamentally Anglo-Saxon origin, of a work is still a guarantee of quality. In the same line as Ros Agudo we can place the latest study on the Blue Division. X. Moreno, *La División Azul, Sangre Española en Rusia, 1941-1945*, Barcelona 2004. In 2004, Ignacio Merino published the novelized biography of Ramon Serrano-Suñer which, by its approach, lacks significant value to advance in the knowledge of the character. I. Merino, *Serrano-Suñer, Conciencia y Poder*, Madrid 2004

See Ros Agudo, *La Guerra Secreta* cit., p. XXVI.


This historiography, until now focused on a review of the causes and process of the Civil War, already aims at an interest in the political development of Franco’s regime. Such is the case of Pío Moa: P. Moa, *Franco, un Balance Histórico*, Madrid 2005.

It is necessary to emphasize that African policy (which is not included in this section) had a special relevance in the context of Spanish diplomacy during World War II. Spain considered building an African empire at the cost of the French empire (these were, succinctly, some of Franco’s principal requests to Hitler in Hendaye); on the other hand, from autumn 1942, the War moved with full force to North Africa, so that Spanish policy in the protectorate of Morocco was converted into a question of the first order for Spanish diplomacy. In any case, African policy is understood as a colonial process in which what is in play is the administration of territories that are considered as part of the nation in question, so that the works covered in the previous section inevitably tend to mention the African dimension in the Spanish politics. Morales-Lezcano is the greatest expert on the topic. See: V. Morales-Lezcano, *España y el Norte de África (1912-56). El Protectorado en Marruecos*, Madrid 1986. The same must be said of the United States. The relations with North America appear intimately involved in the aforementioned works.


*Ibid.*, p. 73. Thus, by the United States the Consejo was seen as an instrument of fifth-columnism of the Falange in America.


L. Delgado, *Imperio de papel. Acción Cultural y Política Exterior Durante el Primer Franquismo*, Madrid 1992. While the work continues to give preferential attention to the Latin-American environment, Delgado also directs his gaze to other zones of the European continent whose characteristics are still known almost exclusively through his references. This is case of Romania, Andorra or the north of Africa.


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*Europe and the World*
Ibid., pp. 344-345.


Pardo, "Leales, Tibios y Contrarios" cit., pp. 583-587. It was proposed, according to the author, to inform the other American republics that the Spanish Republican community in Mexico was organizing a communist network whose target was the whole continent; *ibid.*, p. 585.


In the line of European conservative thought from the second half of the XIX century.

Rodao, *Franco y el Imperio Japonés* cit., p. 133.


Wang Jingwei, one of the principal leaders of the Guomindang, would be enlisted to lead the pro-Japanese government, after being displaced from the leadership of the nationalist band by Jiang Jieshi.


As a highlight in the field of significant unpublished and unknown documents referring to the period:

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Id., *Memorias: Entre el Silencio y la Propaganda, la Historia como Fue*, Barcelona 1978.


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